Since the early 1990s the US current account and net trade deficit have steadily deteriorated from close to balance to a deficit of more than 5 percent in 2004 and 2005. The fact that this deterioration has occurred relative to all of the major regions in the world suggests that some of the main sources are likely to lie in developments in the United States itself. This paper investigates the role of three likely suspects: technology developments in the US, changes in the fiscal position of the US government and the Fed's monetary policy. For that purpose we estimate a series of Vector Autoregressions on US data over the period 1982:2 to 2005:4 in order to identify five structural shocks: a multi-factor productivity shock; an investmentspecific technology shock, a monetary policy shock and a fiscal revenue and spending shock. Following Gali (1999) and Fischer (2002) we identify the technology shocks using long-run zero restrictions. In contrast, the monetary and fiscal policy shocks are identified using contemporaneous zero restrictions as in Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (1999) and Blanchard and Perotti (2002) . As it has been argued that those shocks account for a large fraction of business cycle fluctuations in the United States, it is interesting to see how much of the developments in the trade deficit can be explained by them. We find that together these shocks can explain the deterioration and subsequent reversal of the trade balance in the 1980s. With respect to the more recent developments, positive productivity developments and fiscal and monetary policy easing play an important role in the rapid deterioration since 2000. However, the structural shocks can not explain why the trade balance deteriorated in the second half of the 1990s. * European Central Bank. Correspondence: rudolfs.bems@ecb.int -luca.dedola@ecb.intfrank.smets@ecb.int -. The views expressed are solely our own and do not necessarily reflect those of the European Central Bank. We thank Helen Popper, our discussant at the conference on "The euro and the dollar in a globalised economy" in Santa Cruz for very useful comments.
Introduction
Since the early 1990s the US current account and net trade deficit have steadily deteriorated from close to balance to a deficit of more than 5 percent in 2004 and 2005 (see Figure 1) . As a counterpart, a number of countries/regions have developed large surpluses vis-à-vis the United States (Figure 2 ). The emergence of those global current account imbalances has generated a large literature investigating the sources of the imbalances, their sustainability and the likely adjustment mechanism including the role of the exchange rate in this adjustment and the implications of the adjustment process for global growth and financial markets.
1 Clearly, both the sustainability and the features of the adjustment mechanism depend very much on the sources behind the emergence of the imbalances. A number of authors have focused on developments in the US economy, in particular the productivity boom starting in the second half of the 1990s, but also developments in fiscal and monetary policy in particular since the start of the new millennium. 2 Others have emphasized excess savings in Asian countries pointing out that following the Asian crisis in 1997 savings rates in many
Asian countries remained relatively high in spite of falling investment rates. 3 Still others have highlighted the efforts of some Asian monetary authorities to resist an appreciation of their respective currencies and to accumulate large quantities of foreign reserves. 4 Finally, more recently the recycling of the increased oil revenues by oil-producing countries has been pointed out as a major factor (e.g. WEO, 2006). 5 In this paper, we focus on the role of domestic US factors. The main reason for doing so is that, as illustrated in Table 1 , the secular deterioration of the net trade balance has occurred relative to most of the major regions in the world. This suggests that some of the main sources are likely to lie in developments in the United States itself.
The paper investigates the role of three likely suspects: US productivity developments and the new-economy boom, changes in the fiscal position of the US government and the Fed's monetary policy. For that purpose we estimate Vector Autoregressions (VARs_ on US data and identify various structural shocks: a multi-factor productivity shock; an investment-specific or embodied technology shock, a monetary policy shock and a fiscal revenue and expenditure shock.
In Section 2, we analyze the effects of those shocks separately following and extending an extensive academic literature that uses VARs to investigate the role of those shocks in US business cycles. In Section 2.1, we identify the technology shocks using long-run zero restrictions on labour productivity and the relative price of investment equipment respectively following Gali (1999) and Fischer (2002) . Section 2.2 focuses on the role of fiscal policy and following Perotti (2004) uses contemporaneous zero restrictions to identify both government spending and revenue shocks. Finally, Section 2.3. analyses the role of monetary policy shocks as in Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (1999) and Kim (2001) .
As argued in Altig et al (2004) , a number of those shocks can account for a large fraction of business cycle fluctuations in the United States. It is therefore interesting to see how much of the developments in the trade balance can be explained by those
shocks. An important caveat to this US focused approach is that only asymmetric shocks are likely to affect current account and trade balances (Glick and Rogoff, 1995) . Ignoring the international comovement and transmission of the US shocks as well as the incidence of foreign shocks may bias our results. However, the direction of this bias is not clear. To the extent that the identified shocks are common across countries, the estimated effects on the trade balance are likely to be underestimated. In contrast, if domestic and foreign shocks are negatively correlated, the estimated effects may be overestimated.
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Notwithstanding these caveats, we find that each of the structural shocks have an economically and often statistically significant impact on the trade balance more or less in line with a priori reasoning: Positive technology shocks and expansionary fiscal and monetary policy developments lead to a deterioration of the trade balance.
Together the shocks explain the deterioration of the trade balance in the early 1980s
and its subsequent return to balance in the second half of the 1980s. In order to estimate the effects of the various shocks, we use a common data sample starting in the early 1980s (1982:2-2005: 4 to be precise). There are various reasons for restricting the analysis to the last two decades or so. First, given our interest in understanding the US trade balance, it is important to focus on a period when the international markets in goods, services and financial assets were more or less liberalized. The 1980s was a period of general liberalization of international capital movements in many regions of the world making the external financing of domestic saving and investment imbalances easier. Second, Clarida, Gali and Gertler (2000) have argued that there has been a change in the conduct of monetary policy associated with the appointment of Paul Volker to the Federal Reserve. Gali, Lopez-Salido and 7 All quarterly VARs estimated in this paper contain four lags of the endogenous variables. Valles (2003) present evidence that the change in policy regime has also led to a change in the effects of neutral technology shocks on the US economy, while Boivin and Giannoni (2005) argue that it has also impacted the effects of monetary policy.
Also Perotti (2004) 
Technology
The new economy boom of the 1990s and the increase in expected productivity growth in the United States is one of the most-often cited factors that are used to explain the deterioration of the current account since the 1990s. For example, Hunt and Rebucci (2005) argue that a persistent increase in productivity in the manufacturing/ traded goods sector associated with some learning can explain about one third of the deterioration of the US trade balance over the period 1996-2000. In this story foreign borrowing allows US households to consume part of their future wealth and firms to invest in order to make use of new profitable technologies. It is indeed a well-documented fact that over the past 15 years total factor productivity growth in the US has increased relative to the rest of the G7 countries and the world more generally. Figure 3 reports and add the net trade/GDP ratio in order to estimate the effects of total factor productivity and embodied technology shocks on net trade. As in Fischer (2002) , the six-variable VAR reported in this section includes the log change in the relative price of equipment, 9 the log change in labour productivity in the non-farm business, the associated log per-capita hours worked, the log change in the GDP deflator and the federal funds rate. 10 In addition, we add the change in the net trade/GDP ratio 11 . The two technology shocks are identified using long-run restrictions. In particular, the embodied technology shock is the only shock that has a long-run impact on the relative price of equipment. Moreover, the embodied and neutral (or multi-factor) productivity shocks are the only shocks that have a long-run impact on labour productivity. Finally, using a stylized growth model Fischer (2002) shows that the long-run impact of the embodied technology shock on labour productivity is related to the share of capital in production and uses this restriction as an over-identifying restriction.
12 Figure 4 reports the impulse responses of each of the six variables to both shocks. 13 A number of similarities and differences between both shocks are worth noting. Both increase labour productivity in the long run and lead to a fall in inflation although the timing and the dynamics of the effects is quite different. However, the embodied shock leads to a tightening of monetary policy, while the neutral shock leads to an easing. Moreover, in agreement with the theory, hours worked increase in response to the embodied shock, while they fall in response to the neutral shock. Most interestingly, both shocks lead to a deterioration of the trade balance. However, the impact of the neutral shock is a magnitude larger and more significant than that of the embodied shock. 14 A one percent increase in multi-factor productivity leads to an estimated deterioration of the net trade/GDP ratio by 0.5 percentage points, whereas a similar embodied technology shock has less than half this effect. At first sight, the smaller impact of the embodied technology shock on net trade may seem somewhat counterintuitive as it has a larger impact on absorption and therefore on imports.
However, note that partly due to the differential interest rate response the terms-oftrade deterioration in the case of the neutral shock is likely to be much larger than in the case of the embodied technology shock. This price effect will tend to dominate the quantity effects on the nominal net trade to GDP ratio. This is indeed exactly what De
Walque, Smets and Wouters (2005) find in their estimated US-euro area DSGE model. While the investment-specific technology shock has a larger negative effect on the real trade balance, the terms-of-trade response is much more favourable and tends to dominate in the case of such shocks. De Walque et al (2005) also show that this 12 We find that in the extended sample, this restriction is rejected in the 6-variable VAR. Nevertheless, we still report the results obtained imposing it since they are very similar to those in the benchmark specification of Section 3, where the restriction is not imposed. 13 For clarity, in Figures 4, 5, 7 and 8, we have deleted the confidence bands in order to compare the impulse response of two shocks. The significance of the response of the net trade/GDP ratio is similar to that reported in Figures 12 and 13. 14 As also shown in Figure 12 , the impact of the embodied technology shock on the nominal net trade/GDP ratio is not significant at the 5% confidence level.
qualitative result is independent of whether a high or low elasticity of substitution is assumed. These findings are also partially confirmed in our VAR analysis. Figure 5 shows that the impact of the embodied technology shock on the real net trade/GDP ratio is indeed much larger, reflecting the fact that the terms of trade improves following such a shock.
The ability of the technology shocks to explain the developments in the US external trade balance will be investigated in Section 3. Here it is, however, useful to compare the size of the effects with some of the estimates in the literature. Bussiere et al (2005) extend the study by Glick and Rogoff (1995) and find that a one percent asymmetric productivity increase (as measured by total factor productivity) leads to a current account deterioration of about 0.15 percentage points. Our estimates of the effect of a multi-factor productivity shock are clearly larger, although those of the investment specific shock are somewhat lower. This underlines the need for distinguishing between the various technology shocks when examining their impact on external balances. The role of productivity developments in accounting for the deterioration of the current account in the late 1990s is also discussed in Hunt and Rebucci (2005) using a calibrated two-country DSGE model. They conclude that the productivity shock needs to be augmented with a negative risk premium shock on US assets in order to be able to account for the full deterioration of the US trade deficit in the second half of the 1990s.
Fiscal policy
The twin deficit hypothesis that an increasing government deficit will result in a deterioration of the current account balance is hotly debated. Most of the literature focuses on government deficit or spending shocks. Theoretically however, the effects of a deterioration in the government deficit on the current account may be different depending on the source of the deterioration, in particular whether it is due to increased government spending or reduced taxes. 15 As indicated in Figure 6 , the deterioration of the US government balance in 2001-2003 was mostly due to a fall in government revenues following a series of tax reductions. It is therefore of interest to look at both government spending and tax shocks.
In order to assess the effects of fiscal policy, one needs to take into account the other shocks to the economy as well as the typical automatic stabilizers of fiscal policy.
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In this section, we follow the work of Blanchard and Perotti (2002) and Perotti (2004) to estimate the effects of fiscal revenue and spending shocks on the trade balance.
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The results that we report are based on Perotti (2004) , since this study includes more recent years and reports results for samples starting in the early 1980s. However, similar findings were obtained by extending Blanchard and Perotti (2002) . Apart from a different sample period, the only difference with the VAR specification in Perotti (2004) Table 4 in Perotti A related study is Mountford and Uhlig (2005) , who use sign restrictions rather than contemporaneous restrictions to identify fiscal policy shocks. 18 Blanchard and Perotti (2002) also report separate responses of exports and imports to the fiscal shocks, although it is not the main focus of the paper. 19 For exact definition of both fiscal series see Blanchard and Perotti (2002) or Mountford and Uhlig (2005) . Spending and tax series from Perotti (2004) would be preferred here, but are not publicly available. These series should not be very different from the ones used in Blanchard and Perotti (2002) and Mountford and Uhlig (2005) . In sum, overall we find a significant role of the deterioration of fiscal balances for the deterioration of the net trade balance. The quantitative relevance of fiscal policy shocks for the most recent deterioration of the current account will be examined in Section 3.
Monetary policy
Finally, we investigate the role of monetary policy in the developments of the current account. One popular story is that loose monetary policy following the collapse of the dot-com asset price bubble, the resulting recession and fears of deflation has led to low short and long-term interest rates and rising house prices. 21 This in turn has stimulated domestic demand leading to a rise in imports and a deterioration of the terms of trade, both contributing to a rise in the nominal trade balance deficit. Figure   9 shows that as inflation has declined since the early 1980s, also nominal short and Kim (2001) and Boivin and Giannoni (2005) show that a rise in the federal funds rate leads to a hump-shaped fall in output and a much more gradual decline in prices. Kim (2001) then investigates the effects of a US monetary policy shock on the trade balance and foreign output. He finds that an expansionary monetary policy shock worsens the US real trade balance in about a year and leads to a terms-of-trade deterioration as the dollar exchange rate depreciates. Overall, this contributes to a significant deterioration of the nominal trade balance in the short to medium-run. 21 See, for example, Gros, Mayer and Ubide (2006) . 22 One of the classic references is Eichenbaum, Christiano and Evans (1999) .
In analogy with the previous sections, we update the findings of Kim (2001) by estimating a similar VAR and using a similar identification strategy over the sample period 1982:2 till 2005:4. Apart from the different sample period, there are two main differences in the specification of the VAR. First, we leave out the commodity price index, as over this sample the inclusion of commodity prices did not improve the estimated effects of the policy shock very much (either in terms of sharpening the confidence bands or alleviating the price puzzle). Second, we introduce real GDP and the GDP deflator in log first differences (rather than in log levels) anticipating the specification of the large-scale VAR in the next Section. Neither of these changes has a material impact on the estimated impulse responses. Finally, as with the other VARs discussed in this Section, the net trade/GDP ratio is introduced in first differences and it is assumed that the monetary policy shock can have an immediate impact on net trade/GDP ratio, but that policy does not immediately respond to changes in the net trade ratio. Figure 10 shows the estimated impulse responses of the federal funds rate, the GDP deflator, real GDP and the net trade/GDP ratio to a monetary policy shock over the recent sample. The results confirm the findings of Kim (2001) and Boivin and Giannoni (2005) : An unexpected temporary tightening of the federal funds rate by 50 basis points leads to a hump-shaped decline in real GDP of maximally 30 to 40 basis points and a very gradual (but not significant) decline in the GDP deflator. More importantly for our purposes, the nominal net trade/GDP ratio improves significantly in the second year following the shock. According to these estimates, a 50 basis point policy easing leads to a maximum deterioration of the net trade/GDP ratio of 0.2 percentage points after two years. These multipliers are both statistically and economically significant and appear to be quite robust with respect to adding additional variables. It will therefore be interesting to see how much the monetary policy easing of the early millennium can contribute to the deterioration of the trade balance during that period. This will be discussed in the next section. Figure 11 shows that most of the effect on nominal trade/GDP ratio comes through the effect on quantitaties (real net trade). Somewhat surprisingly, the terms of trade is not very much affected. This is what we do in this Section. In order to maintain enough degrees of freedom,
we restrict the number of variables in the VAR to eight and the number of shocks to four. First, the price of equipment is included in order to identify the embodied technology shock. Second, we use non-farm business sector labour productivity to identify the multi-factor productivity shock. As before, both technology shocks are identified using long-run restrictions. Third, in line with the twin-deficit hypothesis we combine the government spending and revenue shock into one government deficit shock by constructing an adjusted government deficit measure which takes into account the short-run automatic multipliers of the deficit with respect to output and inflation. Fourth, monetary policy developments are captured by the federal funds rate. As before, both policy shocks are identified using short-run restrictions. In addition to the four variables that are necessary to identify the four shocks, we add real private consumption and real private investment (which together form domestic private absorption), the change in the GDP deflator and the net external trade/GDP ratio. Figure 12 reports the impulse responses of the nominal net trade/GDP ratio to each of the four identified shocks (together with two standard deviation confidence bands) in 23 Adding financial variables to the VAR, we also found that the long-term rate does significantly rise in response to the monetary policy tightening. The effect of a 50 basis point increase is to raise the 10-year bond yield temporarily by 10 basis points. Moreover, the policy tightening also leads to a fall in real house prices by about 2 percent. However, this effect is only significant at the 10% confidence level.
two versions of the 8-variable VAR. The upper panel is based on a VAR that includes a drift term (or constant) in the equation for the change in the net trade/GDP ratio.
This drift term captures the secular fall in the net trade/GDP ratio over the sample period by about 0.20 percentage points per year. As the constant is not significantly different from zero, we also report the results of a similar VAR without such a drift term in the lower panel of Figure 12 . Such a VAR allows us to investigate to what extent the four structural shocks can contribute to the secular fall in the net trade/GDP ratio over the full sample. It is easy to verify that in both cases the overall effects of the four structural shocks on net trade are very similar to what we found in the more specialized VARs discussed in Section 2. This shows that the estimated effects are quite robust with respect to the choice of variables that are included in the VAR. As before, it turns out that a one-standard deviation multi-factor productivity and monetary policy shock have the largest and most significant effect on the net trade/GDP ratio.
How much of the swings in the US external trade balance over the past two decades can the four structural shocks account for? Figure 13 gives an answer by plotting the actual net trade/GDP ratio as well as the joint contribution of the four shocks and the baseline over the full sample period in the VARs with and without a drift term in net trade. This figure also plots the contribution of the four shocks to the growth of domestic absorption, the inflation rate and the federal funds rate. Comparing the contribution to net trade in both VARs (Figure 13 ), it is clear that the VAR with a drift term is better able to account for the secular fall in net trade over the sample period. However, it is also clear that the main failure of the VAR without a drift term to account for this trend is located in the 1990s. In fact, it is worth distinguishing three episodes, which are analysed in more detail in Figure 14a 
Conclusions
In this paper we have examined the relative role of technology and policy in the deterioration of the US net trade/GDP ratio since the second half of the 1990s.
Understanding the sources behind the rise of the US external deficit is crucial for have played a role. The part due to technological progress should be less of a concern to the extent that higher future growth is likely to increase savings rates in the future.
However, after playing a stabilizing role in the second half of the 1990s, both monetary and in particular fiscal policy turned very loose at the beginning of the millennium and also contributed considerably to the deterioration of the trade balance.
As those policies are normalized, they could contribute to an improvement of the external balance of around 2 percentage points. Somewhat surprisingly, the estimated structural shocks can, however, not explain the significant deterioration in the late 1990s. One possibility is that our identification scheme fails to capture the impact of embodied technological progress in this period. Another possibility is that other factors such as the Asian crisis and its impact on excess global savings are important determinants in this period. An extension of the VAR methodology to account for such shocks would be a useful area for future research.
Of course, the analysis can be further extended and improved in a number of ways.
First, the robustness of the results reported in this paper need to be further checked, for example by using alternative identification schemes. Second, we need to investigate more closely what are the channels through which the identified shocks affect the overall trade balance. In particular, it would be important to understand the role of the exchange rate and the terms of trade adjustments in response to the various shocks. We also need to analyze to what extent the estimated effects are consistent
with modern intertemporal open-economy macro models in order to increase our confidence in the estimated effects. Table 1 Figure 1 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 1982 -1991 1992 -2000 2001 -2005 
